February 2020 - Idpy-discuss

Agenda: idpy Developers call, 16 May 2019

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Date: Tuesday, 16 May 2018 Time: 06:00 PT | 09:00 ET | 15:00 GMT https://bluejeans.com/163562895 Agenda: 0. Agenda bash 1. Governance update a. Commons Conservancy b. Note Well and licensing by repository vs license in each file 2. Code releases - speed vs stability? a. Resources (do we have enough if we use them well? If not, what are we asking the idpy Board for?) 3. GitHub review a. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2 b. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA c. pyFF - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF d. ... 4. AOB Thanks! Heather

5 days, 8 hours

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Project licensing within IdentityPython

by ivan.kanak＠gmail.com

Hi all, being part of Commons Conservancy brought up yet another subject, which is whether we should add a header with license information in every file in the projects under idpy. This is not something done in an abstract way, there is a specific format modelling this information (see https://spdx.org/ and https://reuse.software/ - more specifically https://reuse.software/practices/2.0/) Still, I find it problematic. We want to open up the question to the wider community and consider their thoughts on this. The forwarded message below is discussing this subject. You can see the question we posed, the answer we got and my comments. Feel free to tell us what you think on this. ---------- Forwarded message --------- Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 at 09:56 > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: May 8, 2019, 8:15 AM -0700 > > > Why does CC think having a single license file per project is > > insufficient? Our thought is that if we can avoid adding a header to > > every single file, that would be nice, esp. given we already have this > > info in the license file and we have the Note Well. > > > this is not just our opinion, but something that is an industry and > community standard for legal compliance these days. When companies like > Siemens, Samsung or Honeywell use some code in one of the hundreds or > thousands of devices and systems in their product line, they need to be > able to provide the correct license and a download of the exact version. > This means machine readability too. > I've actually observed the opposite of that. Communities abandon the "license in every file" model, and just use a single LICENSE file in the root of the project. The LICENSE file contains license information, that is, it is not a single license but it has exception sections and so on. > To quote from https://reuse.software/practices/2.0/ : > > Scroll to the section "2. Include a copyright notice and license in each > file"... > > "Source code files are often reused across multiple projects, taken from > their origin and repurposed, or otherwise end up in repositories where > they are separate from its origin. You should therefore ensure that all > files in your project have a comment header that convey that file’s > copyright and license information: Who are the copyright holders and > under which license(s) do they release the file? > Continuing from above, the standardization of package-management formats and tools has helped exactly with that: to avoid distribution of single files, and instead provide packages and modules. It is bad practice and considered a hack to copy files. Nobody liked that model and everyone is moving away; it is unstructured, it becomes unmanageable and it will cause problems. > It is highly recommended that you keep the format of these headers > consistent across your files. It is important, however, that you do not > remove any information from headers in files of which you are not the > sole author. > > You must convey the license information of your source code file in a > standardised way, so that computers can interpret it. You can do this > with an SPDX-License-Identifier tag followed by an SPDX expression > defined by the SPDX specifications." > > (the text goes on for a while after this, to clarify the point but this > is the basic gist of it) > > There is a nice Python tool to check: > > https://github.com/fsfe/reuse-tool > > I hope this makes sense > Well, it does not make complete sense. We're talking about licensing a project. A project is not just code; there are data files (html, xml, yaml, json files), binary files (archives/zip, images, audio, video, etc), text files (configs, ini-files, etc) all "not-code". How do you mark those files? Does the LICENSE file need a license-header? The json format does not define comments, how do you add a header there? If a binary file does not get a license header, why should a file with code get one? I would expect there to be a way to have the needed information unified. If the files themselves cannot provide this information it has to be external; thus the LICENSE file. If someone is worried about somebody else re-using single files that do not have license information (a python file, a png image, etc) there is really nothing you can do (the DRM industry has been trying to solve for a long time; and still your best bet is "social DRM"). Since, we're developing on open source with a permissive license, even if someone does that, should we be happy that someone is actually using what we built or sad that the files they copied did not have a license header? And if they include the license information of that copied file in their project's LICENSE file, is this solved? Having pointed these contradictions, I am thinking that the "license in every file" model seems to be a step backwards. It is introducing overhead and does not really solve the problem, while at the same time it enables a culture of bad practice (copying files around). Cheers, -- Ivan c00kiemon5ter Kanakarakis >:3

2 months

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PySaml2 v5.0.0 - Security release

by ivan.kanak＠gmail.com

Hello everyone, there has been a report on incident-response at idpy.org about a security issue in PySaml2. Alexey Sintsov and Yuri Goltsev from HERE Technologies reached out and reported a XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) vulnerability. The issue affects responses with signed assertions. PySaml2 can be tricked to think that an assertion had been signed and use the assertion information, when in reality the Signature points to another part of the xml document that is controlled by another party. The issue was assigned CVE-2020-5390 and is now fixed in the latest pysaml2 release. The relevant code commit that fixes is the issue: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/5e9d5acbcd8ae45c4e736ac521… Release v5.0.0 contains more changes, including: - Add freshness period feature for MetaDataMDX - Fix ipv6 validation to accommodate for addresses with brackets - Fix xmlsec temporary files deletions - Add method to get supported algorithms from metadata - Add mdstore method to extract assurance certifications - Add mdstore method to extract contact_person data - Start dropping python2 support Pointers to the release with changelog and more information, below: - the relevant release commit: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/f27c7e7a7010f83380566a219f… - the github release: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/releases/tag/v5.0.0 - the pypi package: https://pypi.org/project/pysaml2/5.0.0/ + + + + + + + + In more detail, regarding the XSW vulnerability: libxml2 follows the xmldsig-core specification. The xmldsig specification is way too general. saml-core reuses the xmldsig specification, but constrains it to use of specific facilities. The implementation of the SAML specification is responsible to enforce those constraints. libxml2/xmlsec1 are not aware of those constraints and thus process the document based on the full/general xmldsig rules. What is happening is the following: - xmldsig-core allows the signature-information and the data that was signed to be in different places. This works by setting the URI attribute of the Reference element. The URI attribute contains an optional identifier of the object being signed. (see "4.4.3 The Reference Element" -- https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/#sec-Reference) This identifier is actually a pointer that can be defined in many different ways; from XPath expressions that need to be executed(!), to a full URL that should be fetched(!) in order to recalculate the signature. - saml-core section "5.4 XML Signature Profile" defines constrains on the xmldsig-core facilities. It explicitly dictates that enveloped signatures are the only signatures allowed. This mean that: * Assertion/RequestType/ResponseType elements must have an ID attribute * signatures must have a single Reference element * the Reference element must have a URI attribute * the URI attribute contains an anchor * the anchor points to the enclosing element's ID attribute xmlsec1 does the right thing - it follows the reference URI pointer and validates the assertion. But, the pointer points to an assertion in another part of the document; not the assertion in which the signature is embedded/enveloped. SAML processing thinks that the signature is fine (that's what xmlsec1 said), and gets the assertion data from the assertion that contains the signature - but that assertion was never validated. The issue is that pysaml2 does not enforce the constrains on the signature validation facilities of xmldsig-core, that the saml-core spec defines. The solution is simple; all we need is to make sure that assertions with signatures (1) contain one reference element that (2) has a URI attribute (3) that is an anchor that (4) points to the assertion in which the signature is embedded. If those conditions are met then we're good, otherwise we should fail the verification. -- Ivan c00kiemon5ter Kanakarakis >:3

2 months

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pyFF: Pipes for additional output formats

by rainer＠hoerbe.at

Hi Leif, I added 2 pipes to buildin.py: - publish_html creates static HTML views of IDPs and SPs, using XSLT based on Peter Schober’s alternative to MET; - publish_split: similar to store, but added validUntil and creates signed XML-file per EntityDescriptor. This can be consumed dynamically by ADFS in an IDP role. I put it directly into buildin.py because it shares some code with the sign pipe. Is this viable from your PoV - if yes, I would make an PR. Cheers, Rainer

6 months, 2 weeks

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idpy dev call CANCELED for 18 February 2020

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Hi all, With so many people at the TIIME Workshop, we’re going to go ahead and cancel the call. A few topics have come up on the Slack channel that are likely of more general interest; Ivan will be posting to the list with more information on those. Talk to you all on our next call, currently scheduled for 3 March 2020! Thanks! Heather

5 years, 8 months

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Notes: idpy dev call, 4 February 2020

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Attendees: Heather, Johan, Ivan, John P, Scott, Hannah, Giuseppe, Roland 0. Agenda bash Idpy.org <http://idpy.org/> domain issue - Leif is working on it Board continues as is, with Roland, Mike, Chris, and Ivan agreeing to serve for a new two-year term. Reminder: Hackathon/Workshop on March 23; please register! Ivan will be sending out information with more guidance on what work will be targeted that day. https://wiki.refeds.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=44959235 <https://wiki.refeds.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=44959235> The idpy BoF was rejected from TNC20. Space too limited. 1. GitHub review a. OIDC - https://github.com/IdentityPython <https://github.com/IdentityPython> (JWTConnect-Python-OidcRP, JWTConnect-Python-CryptoJWT, etc) Libraries are moved to the IdentityPython repository. Coding activity is in progress. There are some issues with Satosa in relation to the OIDC endpoint; GRNET is putting effort into fixing this. Roland is working on a few things in the libraries: pushed authentication, identity assurance (see https://bitbucket.org/openid/ekyc-ida/ <https://bitbucket.org/openid/ekyc-ida/> and https://bitbucket.org/openid/ekyc-ida/issues/1153/request-syntax-complexity <https://bitbucket.org/openid/ekyc-ida/issues/1153/request-syntax-complexity>), mutual TLS b. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA <https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA> Not a lot of progress since the last call. Have been discussing some of the common components between this and a new eduTEAMS project. There is a dependency between the proxy and services that live outside the proxy. Part of the discussion is how to define a common pattern/API on the info sent out to the services. May be encoding this information using SCIM (http://www.simplecloud.info/ <http://www.simplecloud.info/>). This would allow other services to get info from the proxy as well, since SCIM is a standardized model. Ivan will have more information on the wiki soon (and will send to the list) c. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2> Signing encryption/decryption, and the names of identifier attributes: Ivan created a PR about this ( https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/662 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/662>). Would like for people to test that and see if it works for them. It is not following the specs closely, but it shouldn’t cause problems. Ivan will hold off merging it until there has been more testing. Will be merging: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/660 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/660> https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/645 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/645> https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/628 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/628> https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/625 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/625> And then will have a new release. SameSite cookie handling - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/625 <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/pull/625> See also discussion on Slack (https://identity-python.slack.com/archives/C4RR58T6C <https://identity-python.slack.com/archives/C4RR58T6C>) This will be part of the code; no other changes will be needed by deployers. Target release before end of February d. pyFF - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF <https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF> No update 2. AOB Next call scheduled for 18 February 2020

5 years, 8 months

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Reminder: idpy dev call, 4 February 2020

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

5 years, 9 months

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Idpy-discuss February 2020