Hi all,
being part of Commons Conservancy brought up yet another subject,
which is whether we should add a header with license information in
every file in the projects under idpy. This is not something done in
an abstract way, there is a specific format modelling this information
(see https://spdx.org/ and https://reuse.software/ - more specifically
https://reuse.software/practices/2.0/) Still, I find it problematic.
We want to open up the question to the wider community and consider
their thoughts on this. The forwarded message below is discussing this
subject. You can see the question we posed, the answer we got and my
comments. Feel free to tell us what you think on this.
---------- Forwarded message ---------
Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 at 09:56
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: May 8, 2019, 8:15 AM -0700
>
> > Why does CC think having a single license file per project is
> > insufficient? Our thought is that if we can avoid adding a header to
> > every single file, that would be nice, esp. given we already have this
> > info in the license file and we have the Note Well.
>
>
> this is not just our opinion, but something that is an industry and
> community standard for legal compliance these days. When companies like
> Siemens, Samsung or Honeywell use some code in one of the hundreds or
> thousands of devices and systems in their product line, they need to be
> able to provide the correct license and a download of the exact version.
> This means machine readability too.
>
I've actually observed the opposite of that. Communities abandon the
"license in every file" model, and just use a single LICENSE file in
the root of the project. The LICENSE file contains license
information, that is, it is not a single license but it has exception
sections and so on.
> To quote from https://reuse.software/practices/2.0/ :
>
> Scroll to the section "2. Include a copyright notice and license in each
> file"...
>
> "Source code files are often reused across multiple projects, taken from
> their origin and repurposed, or otherwise end up in repositories where
> they are separate from its origin. You should therefore ensure that all
> files in your project have a comment header that convey that file’s
> copyright and license information: Who are the copyright holders and
> under which license(s) do they release the file?
>
Continuing from above, the standardization of package-management
formats and tools has helped exactly with that: to avoid distribution
of single files, and instead provide packages and modules. It is bad
practice and considered a hack to copy files. Nobody liked that model
and everyone is moving away; it is unstructured, it becomes
unmanageable and it will cause problems.
> It is highly recommended that you keep the format of these headers
> consistent across your files. It is important, however, that you do not
> remove any information from headers in files of which you are not the
> sole author.
>
> You must convey the license information of your source code file in a
> standardised way, so that computers can interpret it. You can do this
> with an SPDX-License-Identifier tag followed by an SPDX expression
> defined by the SPDX specifications."
>
> (the text goes on for a while after this, to clarify the point but this
> is the basic gist of it)
>
> There is a nice Python tool to check:
>
> https://github.com/fsfe/reuse-tool
>
> I hope this makes sense
>
Well, it does not make complete sense. We're talking about licensing a
project. A project is not just code; there are data files (html, xml,
yaml, json files), binary files (archives/zip, images, audio, video,
etc), text files (configs, ini-files, etc) all "not-code". How do you
mark those files? Does the LICENSE file need a license-header? The
json format does not define comments, how do you add a header there?
If a binary file does not get a license header, why should a file with
code get one?
I would expect there to be a way to have the needed information
unified. If the files themselves cannot provide this information it
has to be external; thus the LICENSE file. If someone is worried about
somebody else re-using single files that do not have license
information (a python file, a png image, etc) there is really nothing
you can do (the DRM industry has been trying to solve for a long time;
and still your best bet is "social DRM").
Since, we're developing on open source with a permissive license, even
if someone does that, should we be happy that someone is actually
using what we built or sad that the files they copied did not have a
license header? And if they include the license information of that
copied file in their project's LICENSE file, is this solved?
Having pointed these contradictions, I am thinking that the "license
in every file" model seems to be a step backwards. It is introducing
overhead and does not really solve the problem, while at the same time
it enables a culture of bad practice (copying files around).
Cheers,
--
Ivan c00kiemon5ter Kanakarakis >:3
Hello everyone,
there has been a report on incident-response at idpy.org about a security
issue in PySaml2.
Alexey Sintsov and Yuri Goltsev from HERE Technologies reached out and
reported a XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) vulnerability. The issue
affects responses with signed assertions. PySaml2 can be tricked to
think that an assertion had been signed and use the assertion
information, when in reality the Signature points to another part of
the xml document that is controlled by another party.
The issue was assigned CVE-2020-5390 and is now fixed in the latest
pysaml2 release.
The relevant code commit that fixes is the issue:
https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/5e9d5acbcd8ae45c4e736ac521…
Release v5.0.0 contains more changes, including:
- Add freshness period feature for MetaDataMDX
- Fix ipv6 validation to accommodate for addresses with brackets
- Fix xmlsec temporary files deletions
- Add method to get supported algorithms from metadata
- Add mdstore method to extract assurance certifications
- Add mdstore method to extract contact_person data
- Start dropping python2 support
Pointers to the release with changelog and more information, below:
- the relevant release commit:
https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/f27c7e7a7010f83380566a219f…
- the github release:
https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/releases/tag/v5.0.0
- the pypi package:
https://pypi.org/project/pysaml2/5.0.0/
+ + + + + + + +
In more detail, regarding the XSW vulnerability:
libxml2 follows the xmldsig-core specification. The xmldsig
specification is way too
general. saml-core reuses the xmldsig specification, but constrains it to use of
specific facilities. The implementation of the SAML specification is
responsible to
enforce those constraints. libxml2/xmlsec1 are not aware of those
constraints and thus
process the document based on the full/general xmldsig rules.
What is happening is the following:
- xmldsig-core allows the signature-information and the data that was
signed to be in
different places. This works by setting the URI attribute of the
Reference element.
The URI attribute contains an optional identifier of the object
being signed. (see
"4.4.3 The Reference Element" --
https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/#sec-Reference)
This identifier is actually a pointer that can be defined in many
different ways; from
XPath expressions that need to be executed(!), to a full URL that
should be fetched(!)
in order to recalculate the signature.
- saml-core section "5.4 XML Signature Profile" defines constrains on
the xmldsig-core
facilities. It explicitly dictates that enveloped signatures are the
only signatures
allowed. This mean that:
* Assertion/RequestType/ResponseType elements must have an ID attribute
* signatures must have a single Reference element
* the Reference element must have a URI attribute
* the URI attribute contains an anchor
* the anchor points to the enclosing element's ID attribute
xmlsec1 does the right thing - it follows the reference URI pointer
and validates the
assertion. But, the pointer points to an assertion in another part of
the document; not
the assertion in which the signature is embedded/enveloped. SAML
processing thinks that
the signature is fine (that's what xmlsec1 said), and gets the
assertion data from the
assertion that contains the signature - but that assertion was never
validated. The
issue is that pysaml2 does not enforce the constrains on the signature
validation
facilities of xmldsig-core, that the saml-core spec defines.
The solution is simple; all we need is to make sure that assertions
with signatures (1)
contain one reference element that (2) has a URI attribute (3) that is
an anchor that
(4) points to the assertion in which the signature is embedded. If
those conditions are
met then we're good, otherwise we should fail the verification.
--
Ivan c00kiemon5ter Kanakarakis >:3
Hi Leif,
I added 2 pipes to buildin.py:
- publish_html creates static HTML views of IDPs and SPs, using XSLT based on Peter Schober’s alternative to MET;
- publish_split: similar to store, but added validUntil and creates signed XML-file per EntityDescriptor. This can be consumed dynamically by ADFS in an IDP role.
I put it directly into buildin.py because it shares some code with the sign pipe. Is this viable from your PoV - if yes, I would make an PR.
Cheers, Rainer
Dear all,
I’m pleased to announce a long overdue update to the Docker Official
Image for SATOSA, which includes several significant changes:
- SATOSA 8.4
- Python 3.12
- Debian 12 “bookworm”
- Alpine Linux 3.19
The updated container image is now available from Docker Hub. For more
information, see https://hub.docker.com/_/satosa.
Happy holidays!
Matthew
--
"The reason that ed is the standard editor is to remind you that
things could be worse, and once were." -- Tim Lavoie in comp.lang.lisp
*Idpy meeting 19 December 2023*
Attendees: Shayna, Ivan, Roland, Matthew E.
0 - Agenda bash
1 - Project review
a. General -
b. OIDC libraries - https://github.com/IdentityPython (idpy-oidc,
JWTConnect-Python-CryptoJWT, etc)
- idpyoidc 3.0.0 released
- openid federation implementation - Roland has openid4v (wallets) -
assumed openidconnect at base but it is oauth.
- Reminder that client registration information is not
well-documented.
- SATOSA container generates xml so that a newbie can get it going;
intent is to have a docker compose project that can stand up an oidc
environment and showcases all different integrations
- Roland has SATOSA OP frontend that is sort of based on Giusppe's
work, but partly new. He has the federation support. Didn't want to be
dependent on MongoDb, has persistence layers with store/fetch. Ideally
there is a function to register an OP (independent of backend).
- Ivan acknowledges that registration process is not well
documented and assumes pre-existing knowledge. Also does not have good
examples. He has not really used the dynamic registration,
but has used
static registration with the database for client data. He has used
different authentication methods for the clients: basic auth or client
secret post. Beyond that things get strange. Basic use cases
are there and
some advanced ones, but some may be missing. The problem is
there is not
just one level of documentation - are you a user, a
developer? Roland has
worked hard on base documentation for idpyoidc at
https://idpy-oidc.readthedocs.io/ but it needs to be updated.
This is for the library. The front end is one layer above and
we could use
documentation for that as well.
- openid federation adds a whole different layer to this. Clients
no longer register, they just become members of the federation.
c. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA
- Considering how to expose metadata in openid federation format
- Some work required before making a new release
- Need to pull in Roland's PR separating pyoidc and pysaml2 from core
- Looking at PR on plugin for getting session info from SAML
entities - but the project tries to keep plugins protocol
agnostic (this is
clearly SAML specific).
- This brings up: how do you map from oidc to SAML? Right now
claims and attributes are mapped; scopes are there but not
really reflected
in internal data. Acr claim and amz claim are also not
reflected in
internal data. Need a document on how to map between the
protocols and
derive the internal data. This is needed if we want to
extend the core with
more protocols.
- jwt token from saml transaction (there is a spec)
d. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2
e. Any other project (pyFF, djangosaml2, pyMDOC-CBOR, etc)
- Matthew working on getting SeamlessAccess pieces into one
release-ready container. If you have feet in both oidc and SAML worlds,
how do you take advantage of scalable federations in both with a
consistent
user experience? He's been coming up with ideas mostly surrounding
mirroring in SATOSA, to expose oidc as SAML. It is tricky, treating the
oidc entities the same as saml identities.
- Discussion of how to handle this; pictures attached.
2 - AOB
- Next meeting 9 January and then every 2 weeks after that
Im looking on how to verify the in_response_to id of the authentication
response.
Most examples use allow_unsolicited to ignore this so it is a bit hard to
find good sources.
Many of those examples also reference to a "built-in cache for authn
request ids in pysaml2", but I can't find any usage of that anywhere.
I have tried to do this myself by just saving the ids I send to a
dictionary and then give them as a parameter
to parse_authn_request_response.
My question is this. How should this really be done? Is there a built in
cache or what is the recommended way of verifying the in_response_to ids?
Thank you
--
Stefan
